On June 4, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, issued a statement that may seem, to external ears, like political posturing: “The United States and Israel can’t do a damn thing.” Yet within the constitutional framework of the Islamic Republic, such utterances do not function as rhetoric alone. They operate as binding pronouncements under the system of Velāyat-e Faqīh, where the Supreme Leader’s speech can constitute normative legal command. This legal dimension is not merely theoretical—it shapes how Iranian institutions respond to questions of war, diplomacy and nuclear policy. As Iran’s nuclear program enters a new phase of confrontation—punctuated by a fresh IAEA censure and intensifying Israeli threats—the legal status of the Supreme Leader’s speech must be understood as a central force structuring state action. This op-ed argues that Khamenei’s June 4 declaration amounts to a constitutional directive that forecloses de-escalation, consolidates confrontation, and potentially clears the path for suspending Iran’s nuclear self-restraints under Shia jurisprudence.

The Legal Force of Speech in a Theocratic Constitution

In Iran, the Supreme Leader occupies a unique intersection of theological authority and constitutional power. Article 110 of the Islamic Republic’s Constitution grants him final authority over military, judicial, religious and strategic matters. His directives—particularly those articulated in the form of ḥukm-e ḥokūmatī (governance rulings)—bind all institutions of the state and remain immune from judicial oversight.

Khamenei’s use of the phrase “they can’t do a damn thing” must be read within this legal context. Originally popularized by Khomeini in 1979 after the US embassy seizure, the phrase first gained juridical relevance when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that Iran bore legal responsibility for the crisis. Although non-state actors initially carried out the embassy seizure, Iran’s leadership ratified the act. The ICJ found that this endorsement transformed it into state action, thereby violating the Vienna Conventions.

Khamenei’s invocation of the same phrase today serves a similar purpose. It signals constitutional commitment to defiance and resistance. In doing so, it shapes legal and strategic boundaries for Iran’s executive and military organs. When spoken by the Supreme Leader, this phrase becomes a performative constitutional utterance, not just a populist flourish.

Nuclear Policy as a Legal Battlefield

Khamenei’s June 4 speech marked a pivotal constitutional moment in Iran’s nuclear trajectory. Delivered amid rising speculation about Israeli military plans and ongoing stalemates in nuclear diplomacy, the speech sent an unambiguous message of defiance. Its impact was immediate and measurable. In the days that followed, Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization declared that nuclear activities would proceed “with full force,” and the General Staff of the Armed Forces warned of a severe response to any “strategic miscalculation.” These statements echoed—not preceded—Khamenei’s directive, illustrating how his language functions as a legal cue for institutional alignment.

On June 12, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution censuring Iran for non-compliance. Tehran responded by threatening further escalation. Iranian officials publicly linked this posture to concerns about Israeli attacks and foreign pressure. But the path had already been signaled by the Supreme Leader. His June 4 declaration, framed in constitutional terms, laid the legal and strategic groundwork for Iran’s posturing. What external actors interpret as a reaction to international developments should instead be seen as the internal operationalization of a speech that—within Iran’s legal system—constituted binding state doctrine.

Khamenei’s phrasing did not describe such a mood. It legally defined Iran’s nuclear stance. By pre-emptively constitutionalizing confrontation, he foreclosed diplomatic flexibility and signaled that future escalation would not be accidental but authorized.

The Fragility of Restraint: The Reversible Fatwā

For years, Iranian officials have pointed to Khamenei’s fatwā prohibiting the acquisition, development and use of nuclear weapons as evidence of Iran’s peaceful intentions. Western negotiators have often treated this decree as a moral and religious guarantee against weaponization. However, that interpretation reflects a profound misunderstanding of the fiqh-based logic underlying Iranian constitutionalism.

Shiʿia jurisprudence permits the suspension or revision of prior rulings under the doctrine of aḥkām al-ḍarūriyya—for legal rulings issued in conditions of necessity. The Supreme Leader, as the Wali-ye Faqih, retains the discretion to override earlier fatwās in response to new strategic imperatives. This capacity to recalibrate moral prohibitions according to evolving threats reflects the inner logic of fiqh al-ḥukūmah (governance jurisprudence). It does not violate Islamic legal norms; rather, it expresses their flexibility in the hands of the jurist-ruler.

Recent signals from Khamenei’s advisory circle suggest that this recalibration may be underway. Several senior clerics and policy advisors have proposed revisiting the anti-nuclear fatwā in light of mounting external threats. The legal infrastructure required to reverse this doctrinal constraint already exists within Iran’s constitutional framework. If such a reversal occurs, it would eliminate the last internal normative brake on weaponization.

In this scenario, escalation would not be accidental. It would emerge as a legally sanctioned pathway chosen by the state’s highest authority. The transition from a religious prohibition to a constitutional mandate would take place not through parliamentary vote or judicial ruling, but through a sentence from the Supreme Leader.

Legal Misreading as Strategic Miscalculation

Policymakers and observers often dismiss Khamenei’s statements as ideological bravado. That approach obscures how legal authority functions in the Islamic Republic. In systems like Iran’s, language performs law. Khamenei’s declarations—particularly when made on institutional occasions—constitute operative legal acts. They do not merely express preferences or rhetorical postures. They draw the boundaries of permissible state behavior and signal alignment across Iran’s bureaucratic and military architecture.

Misreading these signals risks severe strategic error. For instance, interpreting Khamenei’s June 4 statement as “bluster” ignores how the Iranian system processes legal authority. That misreading fosters the illusion of negotiation space that may not exist. As a result, international actors may pursue diplomatic options that Iranian institutions no longer recognize as viable.

Moreover, the timing of the speech matters. Delivered at a moment of acute geopolitical pressure, it serves not only as a response but as a legal act of resistance. By embedding confrontation into Iran’s constitutional order, Khamenei legally narrows the scope of de-escalatory diplomacy. That gesture has consequences that extend far beyond Iran’s borders.

From Internal Collapse to External Escalation

Khamenei’s speech also emerges amid a crisis of domestic legitimacy. Widespread economic deterioration, social unrest and elite fragmentation have weakened the regime’s internal authority. Historically, states under such pressure often externalize conflict to consolidate power and redirect popular grievances. In Iran’s case, the path to external escalation is not only political—it is constitutional. The fusion of theology and law provides a mechanism to legalize confrontation and redefine strategic objectives.

As internal consensus frays, the Supreme Leader can reassert ideological coherence through calibrated conflict. A limited military engagement—especially one cast as a defensive response to Western or Israeli aggression—could serve as a unifying force. That move would not just be politically advantageous; it would be constitutionally legitimate under the doctrine of defāʿ (religious self-defense), which allows the jurist-ruler to override earlier restraints in the name of national survival.

Conclusion: Missiles Begin with a Sentence

Khamenei’s June 4 speech should not be seen as rhetorical defiance. It functions as a constitutional signal—one that reverberates through Iran’s military and political institutions. His statement binds the state to a path of resistance, narrows the scope for compromise, and prepares the ground for escalation under legal cover.

The international community must stop treating Iran’s constitutional structure as opaque or irrational. It must instead engage with the logic of a system where theology, law and sovereignty fuse into a singular authority. In this system, a sentence does not precede war—it initiates it.

If the anti-nuclear fatwā is suspended, that act will not emerge from technical necessity or diplomatic breakdown. It will result from a deliberate, legal transformation driven by the Supreme Leader’s speech. Recognizing this legal architecture is not academic pedantry—it is strategic foresight.

Khamenei has spoken. The question now is not whether the Islamic Republic will act, but whether the world understands what he has already done!

Faraz Firouzi Mandomi is a Ph.D. candidate in law at the University of Hamburg. He holds an LL.M. in European Union Law from the University of Hamburg and an LL.M. in International Human Rights Law from Allameh Tabataba’i University in Tehran. His academic interests include constitutional law, human rights, and public international law. Before beginning his doctoral studies, he practiced law in Iran with a focus on public law and rights-based litigation.